Israel, Makor Rishon
Editorial by Amnon Lord
...Lee Smith lately proved that the estimates spread by the sources in the American administration concerning the duration of the delay to be achieved in the Iranian project is a derivative of reluctance to carry out an attack like that.
Translated by Viktoria Lymar
Edited by Steven Stenzler
15 July 2012
One of the biggest speculations these days is why certain security analysts, along with senior security officials from the past, keep creating such an extreme intimidation campaign regarding possible attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities. The intimidation is involving three themes: the war to break out as a result of the strike will be so terrible that Israel won’t return to be what it was before dealing a blow on Iran. The offensive, even if successful, will only cause an accelerated nuclearization of Iran that would speedily run to the bomb. And last, but not least: the Israeli government and the two spearheading it in this respect, the Defense Minister Barak and Prime Minister Netanyahu, are crazy/stupid, they started believing their own propaganda and now out of commitment to this indoctrination, they may go bomb Iran.
In this light, as Channel 10 commentator Alon Ben-David put it, the top national security mission to prevent the attack on Iran is imposed on the shoulders of solely one man – and that’s Lieutenant General Benny Gantz1.
The possibility that Iran goes nuclear apparently does not frighten these frighteners; since Ehud Olmert2 is back to headlines now, one can understand that the State of Israel goes to war only if its two dead soldiers are abducted. Then it makes sense and is perfectly all right, and also yields achievements and deterrence. But to embark on an operation capable of temporarily eliminating the Iranian nuclear project – oh, no. Nobody’s suggesting that Israel go for such an operation if it doesn’t know how to do this. But if the leaders believe that the IDF3 has managed to create a credible option from an operational perspective, the consideration to attack is obvious. Professor Yehezkel Dror has recently written a special analysis on it – that requires an assault. One of the most serious commentators in the United States, Lee Smith, lately proved that the estimates spread by the sources in the American administration concerning the duration of the delay to be achieved in the Iranian project is a derivative of reluctance to carry out an attack like that. They are talking of a year and a half, two years, maximum three years of setback in the Iranian timetable in the wake of a thorough strike. However, there are external, no less earnest evaluators who claim that a successful bombardment could accomplish a delay in the timetable of between five to seven years. Such an estimation was even voiced in a war game conducted in this newspaper a few months ago. It’s clear that the battle is not over in one military act, but rather continues in the crusade of liquidations of the nuclear masters in Iran.
Nonetheless, the main problem expressed in this atrocious propaganda campaign against the attack is what’s reflected from it as to the assessment of the intentions of the Iranian enemy. What is reflected is a typical Israeli disregard for the aggressive and genocidal intents of the Iranian regime. If it’s not disregard – aren’t we talking insensitivity? It is also a characteristic trait of the Israeli elite since 1973. Prime Minister [Netanyahu] tried to overcome this psychological obstacle through his dramatic speeches on various national and international opportunities. Nevertheless, looks like this is not enough. There’s a severe failure in the communication of the security state leadership with the people. Why is the relevant material apropos the intentions of the Iranians is not finding its way to journalists, to intellectuals, to different media channels? If the raid on Iran is still relevant, and if the time window is in the coming months, someone up there should make the invisible Iranian writing into a screaming neon address.
Original Hebrew article:
1. Israeli Chief of General Staff
2. Former Israeli prime minister; the following is a sarcastic reference to the second Lebanon War (2006) launched during his tenure
3. Israel Defense Forces, lit. "Defensive Army for Israel"